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The recent change of the concept of ‘disability’ by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) in HK Danmark (Ring and Skouboe Werge) represents a 
valuable progress in the pursuit of consistency between the social model of disability 
and the corresponding concept of disability under non-discrimination law. However, 
even under the new concept, there may be disagreement to qualify certain conditions 
as a ‘disability’. Recent CJEU’s case of Kaltoft dealing with obesity reflects this 
difficulty. The purpose of this paper is to assess the relevance and the impact of 
including obesity in the scope of ‘disability’ as a discrimination ground. To that end, a 
comparative approach will be followed by confronting the Kaltoft ruling with 
judicial interpretations under the law of the United States of America. It will also 
be combined with an integrated approach considering the multi-layered nature of 
disability discrimination law from a European standpoint.  
 
Keywords: Discrimination, Obesity, Disability, Weight, Appearance, 
Employment Equality Directive, Americans with Disabilities Act.  
  
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 148 
II. CONNECTING OBESITY TO GROUNDS OF DISCRIMINATION  ............ 153 
1.  Obesity is Not a Stand-alone Ground ...................................................... 153 
2. Connecting Obesity with Available Grounds ........................................... 155 
A. Non-medical Grounds: Appearance and Weight ..................... 156 
B. Medically-related Grounds .......................................................... 157 
3. Connecting Obesity to the Adequate Ground(s) ......................................... 159 
III. LOWERING FOCUS ON DISABILITY’S CAUSATION IN OBESITY  
CASES ................................................................................................................ 163 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* PhD candidate, Institute for European Studies, Université libre de Bruxelles and 
Equality Law Clinic (http://www.philodroit.be/-ELC-?lang=en). See for his personal 
webpage: http://www.iee-ulb.eu/en/joseph-damamme. This research has been funded 
by the French community of Belgium through a doctoral grant (‘mini-Action de 
recherche concertée’). The author wishes to thank Professor Emmanuelle Bribosia, 
Professor Lisa Waddington, Dick Houtzager, Constantin Cojocariu and the 
anonymous peer-reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier 
draft. In addition, Hermine Damamme, Kinshuk Jha, Thomas Helman and Ana 
Lope García offered insightful comments throughout the writing process. The usual 
disclaimers apply.  
2015]        How can obesity fit within the legal concept of disability    148 	  
	  
1.  (Ir)Relevance of Obesity’s Causation ....................................................... 163 
A.  Irrelevance of One’s ‘Contribution’ to Obesity ...................... 164 
B.  Relevance of ‘Physiological’ Cause of Obesity ........................ 166 
2.  Obesity as a per se ‘Impairment’? ............................................................. 167 
IV. SHIFTING THE FOCUS ON DISABILITY’S EFFECTS IN OBESITY  
CASES ................................................................................................................ 170 
1.  Obesity’s Limiting Effects on the Employee (Actual Disability) ................ 170 
A.The General Approach to the Worker’s Limitation (US) ........ 170 
B.  The Contextual Approach to the Worker’s Limitation (EU) 171 
2.  Obesity’s Effect on Minds (Perceived Disability) ..................................... 173 
A. Coverage of Obese Individuals ‘Regarded as’ Disabled ........... 173 
B. Capturing Appearance Discrimination through Disability? .... 176 
V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 178 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
On December 18th, 2014 the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) held in Kaltoft1 that obesity can, under certain conditions, fall 
under the concept of ‘disability’ within the meaning of the EU 
Employment Equality Directive (EED). 2  The facts of the case, as 
presented by the referring court and set out by Advocate General (AG) 
Jääskinen,3 are as follows: Mr Kaltoft worked as a child-minder for the 
municipality of Billund (Denmark) since 1996 and was in charge of taking 
care of people’s children in their own homes. He was dismissed in 2010 
following an official hearing process during which his obesity was 
mentioned. On behalf of Mr Kaltoft, a workers’ union (the applicant) sued 
a national association of Danish municipalities, acting on behalf of the 
municipality of Billund (the respondent) to challenge the dismissal. Before 
the national Court, the parties disputed whether Mr Kaltoft’s dismissal 
was motivated by his obesity. Indeed, the only official reason given by the 
employer was the decrease in the number of children. However, it remains 
unclear why Mr Kaltoft was the only dismissed employee among all the 
child-minders working for the concerned municipality. Before the national 
court, Mr Kaltoft asserted that he was discriminated on the grounds of his 
obesity. Against this background, the national court referred several 
questions for a preliminary ruling, asking notably whether obesity can be 
qualified as a disability for the purposes of EU law (particularly under the 
EED).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Case C-354/13 FOA acting on behalf of Karsten Kaltoft v Kommunernes Landsforening 
(KL), acting on behalf of the Municipality of Billund [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2463. 
2  Council Directive (EC) 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16. 
3 Opinion of AG Jääskinen, Case C-354/13 (n 1) paras 8-10.  
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Under EU law and policy, tackling ‘obesity’ through the lens of non-
discrimination is a novelty. Up to that point, EU institutions had 
addressed obesity only as a public health issue, by developing a strategy to 
‘combat’ it.4 At national level, some Member States have been seeking for 
different means to eradicate the so-called ‘obesity-epidemic’, such as the 
imposition of ‘food taxes’ (also called ‘fat taxes’).5 Contrastingly, obesity is 
tackled in Kaltoft as a feature to protect, here against alleged 
discrimination, rather than to eradicate. Ironically, the same definition of 
obesity is used in both of these contexts (public health and non-
discrimination). As stated by several health authorities such as the World 
Health Organisation (WHO)6 and taken over by AG Jääskinen in Kaltoft,7 
obesity is identified with reference to the ‘Body Mass Index’ (BMI). BMI 
is a formula that consists in dividing an individual’s weight (in 
kilogrammes) by square of his/her height (in metres). 8  The obtained 
numeric result determines whether the individual is overweight or not 
(respectively BMI above or below 25) or obese (BMI equal to or above 30). 
Obesity is commonly classified into three categories: ‘mild’ (BMI ranging 
from 30 to 34.99) ‘moderate’ (from 35 to 39.99) and ‘severe’, also called 
‘morbid’ or ‘extreme’ (BMI of 40 or more).9  
 
Discrimination due to obesity, or generally being overweight, had not been 
a matter of great interest in Europe.10 Contrastingly, and as the reader will 
see along this paper, the issue has been massively discussed in the 
American legal literature. This is partly due to the substantial number of 
cases where obese claimants have sought legal redress before US courts 
against unfavourable treatment (eg refusals to hire or dismissals) allegedly 
based on their weight. More generally, a study of 2008 found that ‘weight 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See eg European Commission, ‘A strategy for Europe on Nutrition, Overweight and 
Obesity related health issues’ (White Paper) COM (2007) 279 final. 
5 See Alberto Alemanno and Ignacio Carreño, ‘Fat Taxes in the European Union 
between Fiscal Austerity and the Fight Against Obesity’ (2011) 4 European Journal of 
Risk Regulation 97. 
6 World Health Organisation (WHO), ‘Obesity: preventing and managing the global 
epidemic: Report of a WHO consultation’ (Report) WHO Technical Report Series 
894, 2000, 9, via http://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/42330 (accessed 6 June 2015).   
7 Opinion of AG Jääskinen (n 3) para 50.  
8 If weight is measured in pounds and height in inches: BMI = 703 x (Weight)/ 
(Height)².               
9 This categorisation is found in the WHO Report (n 6) 9 and referred to by AG 
Jääskinen in his Opinion (n 3) para 50. 
10  See, for an exception, Stuart W Flint and Jeremé Snook, ‘Obesity and 
discrimination: The next “big issue”?’ (2014) 3 International Journal of 
Discrimination and the Law 183 (focusing on UK law).  
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or height’ 11  discrimination was the fourth most common form of 
discrimination experienced by Americans (after gender, age and race).12  
 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the relevance (in terms of reasons 
and suitability) and the impact of including obesity in the scope of 
‘disability’ as a discrimination ground. For the relevance, legal arguments 
for qualifying, and conversely refusing to qualify, obesity as a disability will 
be analysed. The impact will be discussed with respect to two situations: 
the one of individuals who are ‘regarded as’ disabled, albeit they are not, 
and, although to a lesser extent, the one of those who have conditions 
often compared to obesity because allegedly ‘self-inflicted’ (eg alcoholism). 
The paper’s argument can be summarised as follows: ‘disability’ is a 
valuable discrimination ground for obesity considering how this concept 
has been clarified. This should result in including the two aforementioned 
situations. 
 
To this end, a comparative approach will be combined with an ‘integrated 
one’. The comparative approach will consist in confronting judicial 
interpretations of ‘disability’ under EU and US non-discrimination law 
(‘disability’) in ‘obesity-as-disability cases’. The integrated approach 
consists in taking into account all human rights provisions that are relevant 
to disability from a European standpoint. Both will be further explained. 
 
As said, the comparison will focus on judicial interpretations of ‘disability’ 
under EU and US non-discrimination law in ‘obesity-as-disability cases’. 
This means cases where an obese claimant alleges that he/she was 
discriminated against or that the employer failed to provide reasonable 
accommodation and seeks redress under disability discrimination law. 
More precisely, the Kaltoft ruling and EU non-discrimination law (‘EU 
law’), will be compared with case law under US disability non-
discrimination federal legislation, ie the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990 (ADA),13 as amended in 2008 (ADAAA)14 and their predecessor, the 
Rehabilitation Act.15 An EU-US comparative analysis16 is justified for three 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For specific discussion on height discrimination in the US context, see Isaac B 
Rosenberg ‘Height Discrimination in Employment’ (2009) 3 Utah Law Review 907. 
12 Rebecca M Puhl, Tatiana Andreyeva, Kelly D Brownell, ‘Perceptions of Weight 
Discrimination: Prevalence and Comparison to Race and Gender Discrimination in 
America’ (2008) 32 International Law Journal of Obesity 992, 998.  
13 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No 101-336, § 12102(4)(A), 104 
Stat 328 (1991). 
14 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L No 110-325, 112 Stat. 3553. 
15 Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C.A. § (West Supp. 1994). 
16 The comparative approach between US and EU disability non-discrimination law 
has been the subject of several academic works. See generally the recent issue of the 
American Journal of Comparative Law (2012, Vol 60, Issue No 1) dedicated to the 
‘Evolutions in Antidiscrimination Law in Europe and North America’. More 
specifically on the concept of ‘disability’ under US and EU law, see eg Vlad E Perju, 
‘Impairment, Discrimination, and the Legal Construction of Disability in the 
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reasons further discussed throughout the paper. Firstly, and as already said, 
the question asked in Kaltoft has been numerously handled by US courts. 
Secondly, and as we argue, ‘disability’ is similarly shaped under EU and US 
law because of the sub-concepts supposed to clarify it. Thirdly, a similar 
phenomenon has been observed under both jurisdictions. In short, strong 
criticism towards judicial interpretations of disability has been expressed 
and changes have occurred to enhance a broader understanding of 
‘disability’. On the basis of both US courts and CJEU’s jurisprudence, one 
can imagine a disability discrimination suit as a succession of doors, where 
meeting one of the suit’s specific condition represents passing each door. 
Indeed, facing the respondent’s refutation that a certain condition can be 
qualified as a ‘disability’, courts of both jurisdictions have tended to focus 
on this question, rather than on whether the alleged behaviour (or failure 
to act) has occurred.17 Applicants proved blocked at the ‘disability door’ 
very often before the US courts18, including in obesity cases as addressed 
along the paper. Before the CJEU, the ‘closed-door’ scenario occurred 
twice19 out of six cases where the qualification of disability was debated 
between the parties.20 We will assess whether the jurisprudence in obesity-
as-disability cases bear witness of the same evolution from a narrow to a 
broad interpretation. We submit that courts of both jurisdictions have an 
interest in ‘borrowing’21 from each other, with respect to the conditions 
imposed for qualifying obesity as a disability.22 On the one hand, Kaltoft 
leaves at least one question unanswered, potentially answerable in light of 
US experience (the ‘regarded as’ issue). On the other hand, it is worth 
noting that the US Supreme Court has not ruled on the matter yet, leaving 
discrepancies in the lower courts’ jurisprudence on the question of under 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
European Union and the United States’ (2011) 44 Cornell International Law Journal 
101. 
17 Problem pointed out by authors like Lisa Waddington, eg in ‘Not disabled enough: 
How European Courts filter non-discrimination claims through a narrow view of 
disability’ (2015) 1 European Journal of Human Rights 11 and Vlad E Perju (n 16). 
18 See eg Vlad E Perju (n 16) 134. 
19 See Case C-13/05 Chacón Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA [2006] ECR I-06467 and 
case C-363/12 (Grand Chamber) Z v A Government department, The Board of management 
of a community school [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:159.  
20 In addition to these two cases and Kaltoft, see Case C-356/12 Wolfgang Glatzel v 
Freistaat Bayern [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:350 and joined cases C-337/11 and C-335/11 
HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Jette Ring v Dansk almennyttigt Boligselskab and HK 
Danmark, acting on behalf of Lone Skouboe Werge v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on 
behalf of Pro Display A/S [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:222. 
21 Expression employed (with respect to disability discrimination law) by Gerard 
Quinn and Eilionóir Flynn. See ‘Transatlantic Borrowings: The Past and Future of 
EU Non-Discrimination Law and Policy on the Ground of Disability’ (2012) 60 
American Journal of Comparative Law 23.  
22 Some attempts have already been made in this direction before the CJEU by 
referring to jurisprudence under US law to influence the interpretation of ‘disability’. 
See Opinion of AG Kokott in HK Danmark (Ring and Skouboe Werge) (n 20),  para 34, 
fn 17 (reference to the US case on AIDS to highlight the broad understanding of 
disability) and Opinion of AG Jääskinen in Kaltoft, (n 3) (quoting the applicant’s 
argument) para 52, fn 48 (reference to the US case qualifying obesity as a disability).  
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which conditions can obesity be a disability under US federal law. In 
contrast, the solution adopted in Kaltoft, as well as the reasoning 
thereunder, holds for courts of all EU Member States as the judgment was 
delivered in the context of a preliminary ruling. This could be inspiring for 
the US Supreme Court, which might have to handle an obesity-as-
disability case in the future.   
 
The comparative approach will be combined with an integrated one,23 
considering the multi-layered nature of disability discrimination law from a 
European standpoint. In concrete terms, it will be assessed whether the 
interpretation (under EU law) of ‘disability’ with respect to obesity is 
influenced by the United Nations Convention on the rights of persons 
with disabilities (UNCRPD),24 to which the EU is a party25 and by the 
European Convention of Human Rights (‘ECHR’) whose requirements 
have been recognised to be of particular significance to EU law by the 
CJEU.26 
 
What is more, the analysis will be enhanced by cases at national level we 
are aware of (in some EU Member States) to determine how national 
courts and equality bodies have handled obesity-as-disability cases, and 
whether Kaltoft should imply a change in their jurisprudence. Without 
ignoring the fact that obesity raises equality issues in numerous spheres of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Such an approach notably consists in highlighting convergences, divergences in 
different courts’ jurisprudence, as well as mutual influences between them. This 
approach is advocated, inter alia, in the framework of the IAP project ‘The Global 
Challenge of Human Rights Integration: Toward a Users’ Perspective’ (2012-2017), 
via http://www.hrintegration.be/. As Eva Brems puts it, ‘An integrated view requires 
taking into account all human rights provisions that are relevant in a particular 
situation and hence a maximum widening of the range of human rights sources that 
are on the tab’, see E Brems, ‘Should Pluriform Human Rights Become One ? 
Exploring the Benefits of Human Rights Integration’ (2014) 4 European Journal of 
Human Rights, 447, 452. For illustrative work, see the Columnist coordinated by Pr 
Bribosia and Pr Rorive since 2013 in the European Journal of Human Rights. For the 
last issue, see E Bribosia, I Rorive and J Damamme (coll), ‘Droit de l’égalité et de la 
non-discrimination’ (Equality and Non-Discrimination) (2015) 2 European Journal of 
Human Rights 223.  
24 United Nations, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted 13 
December 2006, entered into force 3 May 2008) (UNCRPD). 
25  Council of the EU, ‘Decision 2010/48/EC concerning the conclusion, by the 
European Community (now European Union), of the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ [2010] OJ L 23/35. 
26  European Network of Legal Experts in the non-discrimination field to the 
European Commission, Report, Olivier de Schutter, ‘The Prohibition of 
Discrimination under European Human Rights Law, Relevance for the EU non-
discrimination directives - an update’, 2011, 9, with references to CJEU’s 
jurisprudence,  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/the_prohibition_of_discrimination_un
der_european_human_rights_law_update_2011__en.pdf (accessed 6 June 2015). 
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life, 27  the scope of this paper is limited to employment because EU 
disability non-discrimination law is confined to this sector to date.28 
 
The paper is divided into three sections. It examines first the reasons for 
connecting obesity to disability as a ground of discrimination (Part II). 
Then, it argues that judicial interpretations under EU and US law 
acknowledge a lowering of focus on the causes of disability, including in 
obesity-as-disability cases (Part III). Finally, it contemplates the shift of 
this focus from the causes to the effects of ‘disability’, with respect to 
obesity (Part IV). It ends with concluding remarks (Part V). 
 
II  CONNECTING OBESITY TO GROUNDS OF DISCRIMINATION 
 
1.Obesity is Not a Stand-alone Ground  
US federal law and EU law do not erect ‘obesity’ as an explicit ground of 
discrimination. Seemingly, the same holds true for sub-entities of both 
systems29 under their own non-discrimination law.  
 
At statutory level, US federal non-discrimination law is construed as 
offering protection only for explicitly listed characteristics30 so that no 
protection can be granted on the grounds of obesity alone.  
 
Under EU law, the legal basis allowing EU institutions to take action to 
combat discrimination contains an explicit list of discrimination grounds31 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 For adverse treatment in the sector of access to services, see eg the US case of 
Hallowich v. Southwest Airlines BC035389 (Cal. 1991) (obese woman required to 
purchase a second seat in a plane).  
28 Pending the adoption of the ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing 
the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation’ COM (2008) 426 final (see for its scope, art 3). 
The scope of the EED is confined to employment and occupation (see its scope, art 
3). 
29  For the EU (sub-entities being here states and regions), we can reach this 
conclusion by reviewing all the country reports on measures to combat 
discrimination of the national experts of the European Network of Legal Experts in 
the non-discrimination field, see part 2.1 of each report. To accede to all the reports, 
see its website: http://www.non-discrimination.net (accessed 30 March 2015). For the 
US and at least for state level, we draw on a research on the NOLO’s database, see 
‘Employment Discrimination in Your State’, via http://www.nolo.com/legal-
encyclopedia/employment-discrimination-in-your-state-31017.html (accessed 6 June 
2015).  
30 For the distinction between constitutional and statutory law in this respect, see 
European Network of Legal Experts in the non-discrimination field, ‘Comparative 
study of anti-discrimination and equality laws of the US, Canada, South Africa and 
India’, 2012, 32-36, via  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/comparative_study_ad_equality_laws_
of_us_canada_sa_india_en.pdf (accessed 6 June 2015). 
31  We follow here the distinction between ‘the use of the principle of non-
discrimination law within internal market and citizenship law and the separate field 
of non-discrimination law’ as an ‘autonomous objective’. See for this distinction and 
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composed of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age 
and sexual orientation.32 In Kaltoft, the CJEU was questioned on whether 
there is, under EU law, a general principle of non-discrimination in the 
labour market covering all grounds of discrimination, including obesity.33 
This echoes to the case of Mangold, where the CJEU found that such a 
principle exists with respect to age. 34  To support his allegation, the 
claimant in Kaltoft relied on several national Constitutions, Article 14 of 
the ECHR and Article 1 of Protocol n°12 to the ECHR.35 The ‘national’ 
sources have not been addressed by the CJEU’s judges and the AG alike. 
We can note that some national Constitutions indeed have an open-ended 
list of discrimination grounds. However, this is not assuredly synonymous 
to a general prohibition of discrimination based on all grounds. 
Illustratively, the Constitutional Court of Spain (Tribunal Constitucional) 
established that Article 14 of the Spanish Constitution, albeit open-ended, 
encompasses only those grounds that have been historically linked to 
forms of oppression and segregation towards determined group of 
persons. 36  Based on this jurisprudence, a regional court refused to 
recognise that obesity is a discrimination ground.37 Concerning Council of 
Europe’s sources quoted by the applicant in Kaltoft, both provisions 
contain an open-ended list of discrimination grounds.38 Accordingly and 
contrary to the attitude of the Constitutional Court of Spain, the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)39 has numerously expanded 
the list offered by Article 14 ECHR. In spite of all these references, the 
CJEU refuted that the alleged principle exists and refused to expand the 
list available under EU law. The judges relied on the sole absence of 
mention of obesity in EU (primary and secondary) law.40 The AG had a 
more sophisticated reasoning. Up to now, non-listed grounds had 
experienced an unpleasant fate before the CJEU, as illustrated by Chacón 
Navas41 where dismissal on account of ‘sickness’ was found to be out of the 
scope of the EED.42 This judgment was, however, delivered before the 
entry into force of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) whose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
explanation thereof, Dagmar Schieck, Lisa Waddington and Mark Bell (eds), Cases, 
Materials and Text on National, Supranational and International Non-Discrimination Law, 
Ius Commune Casebooks for the Common Law of Europe (Hart Publishing 2007), 3.  
32 Article 19 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (‘TFEU’). 
33 Case C-354/13 (n 1) para 31.  
34 Case C-144/04 Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm [2005] ECR I-09981. 
35 Adopted on 4th November 2000, entered into force on 1st April 2005.    
36 Tribunal Constitutional (Constitutional Court of Spain), STC 166/88. 
37 Tribunal Superior de Justicia, Valencia, 9 May 2012, Ar. 1843. I thank Pr. María José 
Gómez-Millán Herencia for making me aware of this case.   
38  Specifying that the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the 
Convention (for the ECHR) or in national law (for the Protocol) ‘shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, (…) or other status’ (emphasis added). 
39 See for the list of grounds and corresponding case law, Report (n 26) 15. 
40 Case C-354/13 (n 1) paras 33-35. 
41 Case C-13/05 (n 19). 
42 ibid, para 47.  
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Article 21 contains an open-ended list of discrimination grounds43 and has 
therefore been said to mirror Article 14 ECHR.44 Then, as suggested by 
the AG in Kaltoft: ‘it might be argued that there is a general principle of 
non-discrimination in EU Law covering grounds not explicitly mentioned 
in Article 21 of the Charter’. Yet he recalled that the CFR does not extend 
the competences of the European Union as defined in the Treaties to 
opine that there is no general principle of law precluding discrimination in 
the labour market. 45  In other words, the non-expansion of grounds 
enshrined in the TFEU is an expression of devolution of powers. We can 
add to this conclusion (grounds outside Article 21 CFR are not protected by 
EU law) that grounds inside Article 21 CFR but outside the TFEU are not 
protected either. This holds true until the EU has exercised its 
competences with respect to this ground. 46  Illustratively, the Staff 
Regulation applicable to agents of the EU prohibits discrimination based 
on ‘genetic features’47 (outside 19 TFEU, but inside 21 CFR), a ground 
which is potentially relevant to obesity as discussed below. In such a 
context, discrimination against an EU agent on the basis of his/her genetic 
features would be covered. Therefore, the mirror born by Article 21 CFR is 
a broken one, reflecting only some grounds from Article 14 ECHR to EU 
law.  
 
Given that ECHR law is free from the ‘exhaustiveness hurdle’, appropriate 
redress can be obtained in employment cases (eg refusal to hire because of 
weight), through eg a claim based on Article 8 (right to private life) in 
conjunction with Article 14 ECHR.48 To date, neither obesity nor weight 
has been tackled by the Strasbourg Court as a discrimination ground.49 
When such a suit would be brought, special attention should be paid to 
the choice of the discrimination ground (eg between ‘weight’ and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 The list offered in its Art 21 is preceded by ‘such as’. 
44 Ieva Kalnina and Ugis Zeltins, ‘The Impact of the EU Human Rights System on 
Operations of Private Military and Security Companies’, in Francesco Francioni and 
Natalino Ronzitti (eds), War by Contract: Human Rights, Humanitarian Law, and Private 
Contractor (OUP 2011), 80, 82, fn 11.   
45 Opinion of AG Jääskinen (n 3), see for the full reasoning para 16 to 26 with further 
references. He notably makes reference to art 51(2) CFR which reads: ‘This Charter 
does not establish any new power or task for the Community or the Union, or 
modify powers and tasks defined by the Treaties’ (para 19). 
46 I thank Prof Bribosia for making this point and illustrating it with the example I 
use further. 
47 See Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities, 1st May 2004, 
Article 1(d), http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/toc100_en.pdf (accessed 6 June 
2015). 
48 These provisions have been mobilised in several employment cases, see eg I.B. 
v Greece App no 552/10 (ECHR, 21 October 2013) (dismissal due to HIV leading the 
court to find discrimination based on ‘health’).  
49  We draw on a ‘hudoc’ search with keywords ‘obesity’ (we also did with 
‘overweight’), in combination with ‘Article 14 ECHR’ or ‘Protocol no 12 to ECHR’. 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{%22documentcollectionid2%
22:[%22JUDGMENTS%22,%22DECISIONS%22]} (done on 10 March 2015).  
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‘disability’). Indeed, the ECtHR has identified several grounds that 
warrant a higher level of scrutiny, further labelled in the literature as 
‘suspect’.50 Disability is one of them.51 Concretely, it means that the State 
would have more difficulty to justify a different treatment based on this 
ground because the ECtHR leaves a narrower margin of appreciation to 
the concerned State in this case.52 Therefore, an obesity case may have 
more chances to prevail if based on ‘disability’ than on ‘weight’ or ‘obesity’ 
within the ECHR realm.  
 
2. Connecting Obesity with Available Grounds 
An array of grounds can be mobilised in an obesity case. We will focus in 
this part on all grounds except disability (examined below in section 3 in 
this Part). Some grounds can be the medium for a non-discrimination 
claim involving weight (and by extension obesity), even if apparently 
strayed from it. This is clear from the US experience, notably when courts 
faced weight restrictions in the professional context. In this respect, 
‘disparate treatment’ (US law equivalent of ‘direct discrimination’ under 
EU law) to gender has been found in cases where weight restrictions were 
imposed only on women,53 or enforced at a higher rate against them.54 
Other grounds are more straightforward for obesity. We can divide them 
into two categories: non-medically and medically related.  
 
A. Non-medical Grounds: Appearance and Weight 
Discrimination based on appearance is explicitly prohibited in a few 
jurisdictions within the US (at state55 or sub-state level56) and the EU.57 
‘Appearance’ may be a difficult concept to grasp. Illustratively, the District 
of Columbia Human Rights Act defines it as the ‘outward appearance of any 
person, irrespective of sex, with regard to bodily condition or 
characteristics, manner or style of dress, and manner style of personal 
grooming (…)’.58 This definition could easily encompass physical traits such 
as weight. On the other side of the Atlantic, the French Equality Body 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50  See eg Janneke Gerards, ‘Discrimination grounds’ in Dagmar Schieck, Lisa 
Waddington and Mark Bell (n 31) 35-39 (the author borrows the expression from the 
jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court). 
51 In Glör v Switzerland App no 13444/04 (ECtHR, 30 April 2009), para 84.  
52 Gerards (n 50) 35-39. 
53 See eg Gerdom v Continental Airlines, Inc, 1982. 
54 See eg Union of Flight Attendants v Pan American World Airways, Inc, 1987.  
55 Michigan seems to be the only US State in this respect, see Elliott-Larsen Civil 
Rights Act, Section 37.2202 (2004). 
56 At least Santa Cruz (Santa Cruz Cal., Mun., § 9.83, 1995) and District of Columbia 
(District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. Code Ann. S 2-1402.11, 2002).  
57  France (possibly Belgium through 'physical characteristics '); See European 
Network of Legal Experts in the non-discrimination field to the European 
Commission, Report prepared by Isabelle Chopin and Catharina Germaine-Sahl, 
‘Developing Anti-Discrimination Law in Europe’, 2013, 12-13, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/comparative_analysis_2013_en.pdf  
(accessed 6 June 2015). 
58 District of Columbia Human Rights Act (n 56). 
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(Défenseur des droits) has exemplified ‘appearance discrimination’ with a job 
refusal to an obese individual based on his/her sole physical outward 
without an assessment of his/her merits.59 We can connect this with the 
institution’s investigation against the famous clothing retailer Abercrombie 
and Fitch. The investigation deals with the company’s recruitment methods 
used to hire sales staff on the sole basis of their physical appearance60 
(discrimination ground under French law)61. The link between appearance 
and weight has not been made in the decision of the Défenseur des droits. 
We argue that the link could be made as in nowadays’ society a 
requirement of a certain appearance often goes hand-in-hand with 
selecting slim workers and, as a matter of fact, with excluding job 
candidates who are considered to be overweight. In a recent anonymous 
decision of the institution associated with the investigation against 
Abercrombie and Fitch,62 it concluded on appearance discrimination because 
the company placed a crucial importance on physical appearance.63 Bearing 
in mind that appearance discrimination is not prohibited at the EU level 
and in many EU Member States, we will address whether this type of 
claims could be captured through ‘disability’ (discussed below in Part 4, 
section 2 B).  
 
Discrimination based on weight is neither prohibited in the EU64 nor at 
the US federal level,65 but is in some US sub-entities.66 In Michigan, this 
recognition was justified by the link between weight and ‘certain ethnic 
groups or to women’.67 ‘Weight’ can have an added value to ‘appearance’ in 
certain cases. This is especially true when it is targeted as a quantifiable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 See on the website, http://www.defenseurdesdroits.fr/fr/theme/lutte-contre-les-
discriminations/discrimination-liee-lapparence-physique (accessed 6 June 2015). 
60 See in the press, The Business of Fashion, ‘French Watchdog Probes Abercrombie 
for Discrimination’ http://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/news-analysis/french-
watchdog-probes-abercrombie-for-discrimination (accessed 6 June 2015).  
61 Article L 1132-1 of the French Labour Code (Code du travail). 
62 Défenseur des Droits, MLD No 2014-147, 3 November 2014, 
http://www.defenseurdesdroits.fr/fr/actions/protection-des-droits-
libertes/decision/decision-mld-2014-147-du-3-novembre-2014-relative  (accessed 6 
June 2015), for the facts and company’s presentation see points 1-15.  
63 ibid, point 96 (‘une valeur déterminante’).  See for the association made between the 
investigation against Abercrombie and Fitch and the decision 
http://www.defenseurdesdroits.fr/fr/actualites/abercrombie-and-fitch-grace-au-
defenseur-la-societe-annonce-la-fin-de-recrutements (accessed 6 June 2015). 
64 See Report (n 57) 12-13. 
65  Despite calls from several scholars. See eg Paula B Stolker, ‘Weigh my job 
performance, not my body: extending title VII to weight-based discrimination’ 
(1992) 10 New York Law School Journal of Human Rights 223.  
66 For the full list of sub-federal entities recognising weight as a discrimination 
ground, see ‘Weight discrimination laws’ on the website of the National Association 
to Advance Fat Acceptance, via 
http://www.naafaonline.com/dev2/education/laws.html (accessed 6 June 2015). 
67 See Sondra Solovay, Tipping the Scales of Justice, Fighting Weight-Based Discrimination 
(Prometheus Books 2000), 245. 
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reality (ie when weight standards are imposed) rather than a visible one.68 
Illustratively, in US case of Tudyman v United Airlines,69 an airline steward 
was refused a flight attendant position because his weight exceeded the 
airline’s weight standards. Ironically, this was due to the candidate’s 
excessive muscle tissue, which was the result of bodybuilding. Here, 
‘appearance’ would have proved useless, unlike ‘weight’ because the 
candidate actually looked very fit.  
 
B. Medically-related  Grounds 
Medical disorders are, under various labels70 (‘sickness’, ‘genetic risks’…), 
recognised as a discrimination ground in some EU Member States, but not 
under EU law.71 In the US, it seems that this holds true only for genetic 
disorders, under the larger concept of ‘genetic information’ in the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act (‘GINA’).72  
 
We see four avenues allowing the connection between medical disorders 
and obesity: ‘causation’, ‘effect’, ‘association’ and ‘equation’. We will also 
use these avenues later on with respect to ‘disability’ because this concept 
is identified under both EU and US law with reference to an ‘impairment’, 
a concept often associated with medical disorder.  
 
Causation. This leads us to determine how one becomes obese. As we can 
read from medical research relayed by the WHO73, obesity is due to an 
energy imbalance, which occurs when energy intake exceeds energy 
expenditure over a considerable amount of time. In simple terms, the 
regulation of energy balance may be disturbed by medical disorders such as 
of physiological74  or genetic75 kind. However, discrimination linked to 
‘causation’ seems to be rather a textbook case as an unfavourable 
treatment (eg dismissal) against an obese individual is more likely due to 
other reasons (eg effects) than the medical disorders causing obesity. Still 
and as we will see (in Part III, section 1), obesity’s causation may prove of 
significant importance for the purpose of interpreting ‘disability’ or 
‘impairment’. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Jeffrey Garcia, ‘Weight-Based Discrimination, Is There an End in Sight?’ (1995) 13 
Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal 209, 235. 
69 Tudyman v United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984), ruled under the 
Rehabilitation Act.  
70 Also eg ‘health condition’ and, more narrowly, ‘chronic disease’, see Report (n 57) 
12-13. 
71 See case C-13/05 (n 19) and joined cases C-337/11 and C-335/11 (n 20). However, the 
CJEU made it clear in the latter case that a sickness can amount to a ‘disability’, and 
then fall under the EED protection, see para 47. 
72 Pub. L. No 110-233 § 102(b)(1)(B) 122 Stat. 881 (2008). The accurate provision is 42 
U.S.C § 2000ff (4). 
73 WHO Report (n 6) 101.  
74 ibid, 105. 
75 One may be more likely than others to become obese because some genes result in 
poor appetite control, leading to obesity; ibid, 135-136.  
159  European Journal of Legal Studies  [Vol.8 No.1 
 
	  
Effect. The ‘effect’ link works the other way around: obesity results in 
rather than from medical disorders.76 This targets the situation where side 
effects of obesity (eg shortness of breath and cardiovascular problems) lead 
an employer to do a different treatment (eg dismissal) against his/her obese 
employee because these effects impact on the employee’s job performance. 
 
Association. This consists in focusing on medical disorders associated to 
(accompanying) obesity,77 regardless of whether obesity results in or from 
medical disorders. In this case, courts would rather focus on the whole 
medical situation, including obesity but not exclusively on it. Illustratively, 
in a case under UK disability law,78 the claimant was obese and suffered 
from a wide range of symptoms including asthma, dyslexia, knee problems, 
diabetes and chronic fatigue syndrome, compounded by obesity.79 Herein, 
focus was not put on obesity but on all these symptoms, which were 
qualified as ‘impairment’ (also part of UK’s non-discrimination law 
definition of ‘disability’).  
 
Equation. This consists in classifying obesity as a medical disorder per se. 
There are several examples of this approach, whilst not before courts. For 
instance, ‘obesity’ is inscribed in the WHO ‘International Statistical 
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems’ (CIM 10).80 
Similarly, the American Medical Association House of Delegates has 
explicitly classified obesity as a ‘disease’.81 Arguably, these statements could 
support a legal claim stating that obesity is a disease per se. ‘Equation’ has 
been followed by the Dutch Equality Body (Commissie Gelijke Behandeling), 
albeit not with respect to obesity in general, but to its most severe stage 
(morbid obesity). Indeed, it labelled ‘morbid obesity’ as a ‘chronic disease’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76See Christine L Kuss, ‘Absolving a deadly sin: a medical and legal argument for 
including obesity as a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act’ (1996) 12 
Journal Contemporary Health Law & Policy 563, 574-576. 
77 According to several medical studies relayed by lawyers, obese persons have, in 
general, increased risk of diabetes, hypertension and various cardiovascular 
conditions. See eg Abigail Kozel, ‘Current Public Law and Policy Issues: Large and in 
Charge of Their Employment Discrimination Destiny: Whether Obese Americans 
Now Qualify as Disabled Under the Americans with Disability Act Amendments Act 
of 2008’ (2009) 31 Hamline Journal of Public Law & Policy 273, 279.  
78 Disability Discrimination Act 1995, now replaced by the Equality Act 2010. 
79 Walker v Sita Information Networking Computing Ltd [2013] UKEAT/0097/12. 
80 WHO, ‘International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health 
Problems’ (CIM 10) (Code E66), see  
http://apps.who.int/classifications/icd10/browse/2008/en#/E66 (accessed 6 June 
2015).   
81 American Medical Association House of Delegates, Resolution 420 (A-13), 16 May 
2013,  
http://media.npr.org/documents/2013/jun/ama-resolution-obesity.pdf (accessed 20 
March 2015).  
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or a ‘disability’ in a case concerning a job refusal based on the applicant’s 
weight. 82 As we will see (in Part I, section 3), discrimination was found. 
Still, disability proves more interesting than all these grounds in certain 
cases. 
 
3. Connecting Obesity to the Adequate Ground(s)  
This part aims at showing that disability can be considered as a magnet, 
including for obesity cases. It will then examine what is meant by 
‘disability’ under US and EU law and who are the actors playing a role in 
interpreting it. 
 
Among all grounds connectable to obesity, some are better than others 
from the claimant’s perspective. This paves the way to a ‘ground-shopping’ 
exercise. Three factors influence the choice for the adequate ground(s): 
availability, suitability and advantages. Firstly, a ground may not be 
available under the concerned jurisdiction (eg ‘weight’ across the EU). In 
contrast, disability is a very widespread ground because it is recognised at 
the US federal and EU level. Consequently, an individual allegedly 
discriminated against his/her disability can seek for legal redress, no matter 
where on the EU or US territory the alleged facts occurred. Secondly, even 
if available, a ground may not suit the situation at hand. As previously 
illustrated, ‘appearance’ may not always suit a situation of different 
treatment based on weight as a quantifiable reality. Thirdly, disability is a 
privileged ground. Indeed, if the prohibition of discrimination (direct or 
indirect) applies to all grounds of discrimination, the imposition of the 
‘reasonable accommodation’ duty on employers (under US83 and EU law84) 
is vested only to disability under EU law85 and to disability and religion 
under the US one.86 The duty requires, within the limits of ‘reasonability’,87 
to ‘accommodate’ the needs of persons with disabilities who can then carry 
out their professional duties. To that end, the conditions under which a 
job must be performed may have to be adjusted. The aforementioned case 
before the Dutch Equality Body illustrates that the concept is useful to 
some obesity cases. In this case, an obese woman applied to a postman job 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Both chronic disease and disability are discrimination grounds under the Dutch 
non-discrimination legislation. For the decision, see Commissie Gelijke Behandeling, 
Opinion n°2011-78, 13 May 2011, https://mensenrechten.nl/publicaties/oordelen/2011-
78/detail  (accessed 6 June 2015). It stressed that it is not important whether morbid 
obesity is the result of a chronic disease. Rather morbid obesity must be considered 
as a chronic disease (§ 3.17). I thank Dick Houtzager for having made me aware of 
this case.  
83 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117, 12201-12213 (1994) (codified as amended).  
84 EED (n 2) Article 5. No other ground was granted reasonable accommodation 
under EU law. 
85 Lisa Waddington, Mark Bell, ‘More Equal than Others: Distinguishing European 
Union Equality Directives’ (2001) 38 Common Market Law Review 587. 
86 Civil Rights Act of 1964, title VII, equal employment opportunities, 42 US Code 
Chapter 21, §701(j). 
87 The employer exonerates from the duty if the accommodation would create an 
‘undue hardship’ (ADA) or ‘disproportionate burden’ (EED, n 2, art 5). 
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that consisted in delivering the mail by bicycle.88 The company refused as 
it deemed that she would not be able to carry out the required professional 
duties because of her overweightness. The Dutch institution emphasised 
that the company did not consider other accommodation options: for 
instance delivering the mail by foot or car. Thus, it concluded that the 
decision was based on general assumptions and therefore discriminatory.89  
 
Now, what is meant by ‘disability’? Reading both US and EU versions of 
‘disability’, we submit that they are construed in a similar way, namely 
endorsing a causal relationship formula. Under US law, disability has been 
defined by the legislator (Congress) in the successive Acts on disability 
discrimination (with respect to an individual) as: ‘(A) a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of 
such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; (C) being regarded as 
having such an impairment.’90 Each prong tackles a different situation, 
usually referred to as, respectively, ‘actual’, ‘past’ and ‘perceived’ 
disability.91 Impairment appears in each prong of the definition. The causal 
relationship is particularly obvious for the actual and the past one, as the 
ADA states that an individual has a ‘disability’ when he/she has (or used to 
have) an impairment (causal element) that limits (or used to limit) a major 
life activity (consequence element). For the 'regarded as' prong, the origin 
of the disability lies in others’ reaction to the impairment.  
 
In contrast with US law, EU non-discrimination law does not have a 
written definition of ‘disability’, which led the CJEU to construe this 
concept. Importantly, it has been recently reframed92 in the case of HK 
Danmark (Ring and Skouboe Werge).93  On the basis of this ruling, AG 
Jääskinen identified six constituting elements of ‘disability’. In his own 
words, the concept  
 
must be understood as referring to limitations which 
result, in particular, from (i) long-term […] (ii) physical, 
mental or psychological impairments (iii) which in 
interaction with various barriers […] (iv) may hinder (v) 
the full and effective participation of the person in 
professional life (vi) on an equal basis with other 
workers.94  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 See Commissie Gelijke Behandeling (n 82). 
89 ibid, point 3.18.  
90 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A-C). 
91 Jane B Korn, ‘Too Fat’ (2009) Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper, No 09-27.  
92 The CJEU changed the definition of its ruling Chacón Navas (n 19).  
93 Joined Cases C-335/11 and C-337/11 (n 20) para 38. For an analysis of thereasons and 
the impact of the redefinition, see Joseph Damamme, ‘La socialisation de la notion 
de handicap en droit de la non-discrimination’ (2013) 5 European Journal of Human 
Rights 836. 
94 Case C-354/13 (n 3), Opinion of AG Jääskinen, para 30. 
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Out of all these elements, the causation element of ‘disability’ is worded as 
a ‘limitation’, itself resulting (in the CJEU’s words) from an impairment, 
which interacts with ‘various barriers’ (points (i) to (iii)). The consequence 
element emerges from points (iv) and (v). The remaining points (eg the 
long-term character) will not be addressed in this paper. The fact that the 
components of ‘disability’ are preceded by ‘in particular’ has unknown 
potential.  
 
By carving up the concept into distinguished elements, the AG suggests 
that each of them constitutes a necessary piece of the puzzle. Supposedly, 
this means that each one is a potential deadlock on the disability door (to 
stay on the image of a disability discrimination claim as a series of doors).    
 
As a consequence of the multi-layered nature of disability law, the CJEU 
has made it clear that the EU concept of ‘disability’ must be interpreted in 
a manner consistent with the UN one.95 Pursuant to its article 1(2), (under 
‘purpose’):96   
 
(P)ersons with disabilities include those who have long-
term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments 
which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their 
full and effective participation in society on an equal basis 
with others.  
 
There are some differences between the UN and the EU concept, even 
though the former has been built upon the latter. These differences are 
further addressed below. 
 
It is also important to highlight the institutional actors fulfilling functions 
with respect to the interpretation of ‘disability’. The first function consists 
in interpreting this concept and deciding on a case where ‘disability’ is 
discussed. This function lies with the courts and equality bodies, as we 
have already seen. Without deciding on a case in the strict sense, other 
actors may play a role in influencing courts or equality bodies in the 
interpretation of ‘disability’. Illustratively and concerning the CJEU, AGs 
have given their opinion on the issue in several cases. In the US, Congress 
has expressly delegated to the US Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) the administration of the ADA’s relevant 
provisions.97 Accordingly, this agency issued several documents, where we 
can find detailed guidance on how ‘disability’ should be interpreted. As we 
will see, US courts often rely on them. In addition, the EEOC can bring 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Joined Cases C-335/11 and C-337/11 (n 20), para 32. In contrast, the USA does not 
have such constraint as they have not ratified the UNCRPD. 
96 As suggested by Lisa Waddington this concept is meant to bring guidance rather 
than a definition (in the strict sense) (n 17) 27-28. 
97 42 U.S.C. § 12205(A).  
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cases to courts on behalf of aggrieved individuals98 and plead that a given 
condition (eg obesity) qualifies as a ‘disability’. Under the EU institutional 
framework, the European Commission (Commission) is vested with fewer 
powers than the EEOC in this respect. Accordingly, it has not provided 
general guidance on how to interpret ‘disability’ (and sub-concepts 
composing it).99 However, and as illustrated in Kaltoft,100 the Commission 
can give its opinion in a preliminary reference procedure by submitting 
written submissions to the CJEU and plead before it.  
 
III. LOWERING FOCUS ON DISABILITY’S CAUSATION IN OBESITY 
CASES 
 
1. (Ir)Relevance of Obesity’s Causation 
As referred above, ‘impairment’ is part of the causation element of 
disability under both the ADA and EED. But what does ‘impairment’ 
mean? It is not clear under EU law as there is no guidance in this respect 
(including from the UNCRPD and jurisprudence thereunder)101.  
 
Generally, this concept is associated with a medical disorder or medical 
condition.102 More guidance is provided in EEOC regulations under the 
ADA. Therein, physical and mental impairment are separately defined. 
Thus, physical impairment is:  
 
[A]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic 
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of 
the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, 
special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117(A) which incorporates by reference sections 706(f)(1) and (3) of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended §§2000e-5(f)(1) and (3).  
99 This is typified by its Joint Report of 17 January 2014 on the application of Council 
Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (‘Racial Equality 
Directive’) and of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a 
general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (‘Employment 
Equality Directive’) COM (2014) 2 final, as well as the annexes to this report (see 
respectively point 4.5 and Annex II-5).  
100 Commission’s written submissions are not accessible but there are some insights 
of it in the AG’s opinion (n 3) paras 39, 43, 46 and 53.  
101 The UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is entitled to 
‘receive and consider communications from or on behalf of individuals or groups of 
individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that 
State Party of the provisions of the Convention’, see Optional Protocol to UNCRPD 
(entered into force with the UNCRPD on 3 May 2008), Article 1 § 1) provided that 
the concerned State has ratified it, (Article 1 § 2 of the same Protocol). For the full 
Committee’s jurisprudence: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/Jurisprudence.aspx  (accessed 6 
June 2015). 
102  See eg Lisa Waddington when she states, commenting Kaltoft, ‘impairment, 
understood as an underlying medical condition […]’ (n 17) 22.  
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cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, 
hemic and lymphatic, skin and endocrine.103  
 
Before the US courts, obesity has been addressed rather with respect to 
‘physical’ impairment, but could also have been  a mental or psychological 
one.104 Indeed, and as William C Taussig suggests, compulsive overeating 
is rather a psychological disorder than a physical one.105 In addition to this 
definition, the regulations clearly exclude from the scope of ‘impairment’ 
characteristics ‘such (…) weight (…) that are within ‘normal’ range and are 
not the result of a physiological disorder’.106  
 
In the first version of these regulations, the EEOC stated that ‘except in 
rare circumstances, obesity is not considered a disabling impairment.’107 
Before the US courts, the interpretation of this concept has often been 
disputed in obesity cases, unlike in cases dealing with other conditions.108  
 
Two topics have often been subject of dispute. The first is common to 
both EU and US jurisdictions, whilst the second has been tackled by the 
US courts (and not by the CJEU in Kaltoft). 
 
A. Irrelevance of One’s ‘Contribution’ to Obesity 
At times, certain conditions are labelled before courts or in the literature 
as ‘voluntary disabilities’ endorsing the premise that they are caused, 
continue to exist, or are worsened by the individual’s conduct.109 In several 
US obesity cases and in Kaltoft, the defendant typically argues that obesity 
is voluntary110 and therefore does not amount to an ‘impairment’ or a 
‘disability’.111 This argument is framed under two different facets. The first 
one, ‘action’, attributes obesity to certain behaviours (eg lifestyle, eating 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). Phrased the same way as in the Rehabilitation Act’s 
regulations, see 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(A)–(B). 
104  Here, the definition takes the form of an illustrative list, and is therefore 
potentially broader. Indeed, mental or psychological disorder includes 'mental 
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific 
learning disabilities' (45 CFR 1181.103). 
105 See William C Taussig, ‘Weighing In Against Obesity Discrimination: Cook v. 
Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals and the 
Recognition of Obesity as a Disability Under the Rehabilitation Act and the 
Americans With Disabilities Act’ (1994) 35 Boston College Law Review 927, 958. 
106 29 C.F.R § 1630 app to § 1630.2(h). 
107 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(j). 
108 For conditions such as diabetes, the focus was laid on their effects rather than on 
their causes, see Jane B Korn, ‘Fat’ (1997) 77 Boston University Law Review 25.  
109  See eg Lisa E Key, ‘Voluntary Disabilities and the ADA: A Reasonable 
Interpretation of “Reasonable Accommodations”’ (1996) 48 Hastings Law Journal 75. 
110 Lucy Wang, ‘Weight Discrimination: One Size Fits All Remedy?’ (2008) 117 Yale 
Law Journal 1900, 1919.  
111 At times, judges on their own motion assert that voluntary disabilities do not 
deserve disability discrimination protection, see Missouri Commission on Human Rights 
v Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. (699 S.W.2d at 79) (plaintiff denied protection 
because she took ‘no steps to treat and control her impairment’). 
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habits…). The second, ‘inaction’, posits that obesity is ‘mutable’ meaning 
that it can be eliminated or reduced thanks to different remedies (eg 
physical exercise, medical therapy, surgery). In the case of Tudyman, the 
court emphasised that weight was ‘self-imposed and voluntary’ because it 
resulted from ‘avid bodybuilding’ and not from ‘physiological disorder’, 
‘cosmetic disfigurement’ or ‘anatomical loss’.112 With respect to obesity, 
courts have rather relied on the ‘inaction’ facet. Several have found obesity 
to be a ‘mutable’ condition that had to be distinguished from ‘immutable 
condition such as blindness or lameness’. 113  In this respect Lisa Key 
proposed to make a distinction between ‘immutable impairments’ that 
may originally be caused by voluntary conduct and those that persist or are 
exacerbated by voluntary conduct. 114  This would lead to distinguish 
between an individual who became obese (supposed this can be qualified as 
a voluntary conduct, which is arguable) because of bad eating habits and an 
obese individual who does not follow the wellness programme advised by 
his/her doctor to lose weight.115  
 
In Cook,116 the court foreclosed the voluntary argument, in both its facets 
(action and inaction). It particularly emphasised that US federal law 
‘contains no language suggesting that its protection is linked to how an 
individual became impaired, or whether an individual contributed to his or 
her impairment’.117  
 
The CJEU ruled in the same way holding that ‘disability’ ‘does not depend 
on the extent to which the person may or may not have contributed to the 
onset of his disability.’118 Particularly, the AG opined that the alternative 
would lead to the exclusion of ‘physical disabilities resulting from 
conscious and negligent risk-taking in traffic or in sports.’119 This solution 
is to be welcome as the contrary would have led to adding another 
condition to the ones already required. What is more, the voluntary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 See Tudyman v United Airlines (n 69). 
113 Greene v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 548 F. Supp. 3 (W.D. Wash. 1981). 
114 Lisa E Key (n 109) 75. The author however concludes that excluding ‘mutable 
impairments’ from the definition of ‘disability’ is ‘not practical’ and proposes as an 
alternative to make the distinction when analysing the reasonability of an 
accommodation, see 93-103.  
115 These programmes often include fitness and physical training sessions, as it was 
the case for Mr Kaltoft (see Opinion of AG Jääskinen (n 3) para 8). Their efficiency 
for losing weight is challenged for obese individuals. Some researchers contend that 
physical activity does not promote weight loss, see A Malhotra, T Noakes and S 
Phinney, ‘It is time to bust the myth of physical inactivity and obesity: you cannot 
outrun a bad diet’ (2015)  British Journal of Sports Medicine, Editorial published 
online http://bjsm.bmj.com/content/early/2015/05/07/bjsports-2015-094911.full  
(accessed 6 June 2015).  
116 Cook v Rhode Island, Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 
1993). 
117 ibid. 
118 Case C-354/13 (n 1) para 56.  
119 Opinion of AG Jääskinen (n 3) para 58. 
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character of these conditions is arguable.120 As was the case in Kaltoft, the 
respondent often stresses that accepting to qualify obesity as ‘disability’ 
would run the risk of expanding this concept to conditions such as 
alcoholism or drug abuse.121 This argument was discussed by the AG, 
unlike by the CJEU’s judges. Recognising that these conditions can be a 
‘disease’ in medical terms, he shifted the discussion from whether these 
conditions can be embodied in ‘disability’ to the practical consequences of 
this embodiment. In his own words, ‘[t]his does not, however, mean that 
an employer would be required to tolerate an employee’s breach of his 
contractual obligations by reference to these diseases’, stressing that the 
EED requires only ‘reasonable’ accommodation to be provided.122 Focusing 
on reasonable accommodation rather than on ‘disability’ may imply that 
the AG admits that these conditions can be qualified as a disability within 
the meaning of the EED. Interestingly, alcoholism has been qualified as a 
protected disability under US law.123 In this respect, US experience shows 
that the link between alcoholism and breach of professional obligations is 
not as straightforward as the AG in Kaltoft seems to suggest. Indeed, some 
US courts have imposed accommodations for alcoholism124 on employers 
in several cases. The case is slightly different for ‘current drug abuse’, 
which is explicitly excluded from the scope of ‘disability’ under the 
ADA. 125  CJEU’s judges failed to address this sensitive question, with 
respect to both alcoholism and drug abuse. This probably lies in the 
political discomfort towards potential consequences that the alternative 
solution would expose. We opine that the CJEU should equally refute the 
voluntary argument for alcoholism or drug abuse as it did for obesity in 
order to ensure consistency.  
 
B. Relevance of ‘Physiological’ Cause of Obesity 
In the US, obesity can result from ‘physiological’ disorders, which is 
precisely one of the concepts referred to in EEOC regulations to interpret 
‘impairment’. Against this background, the question whether claimant’s 
obesity was physiologically-based or not was discussed in several cases. 
 
In Cook, the court found that morbid obesity was, in this case, a 
physiological disorder as the claimant’s obesity involved ‘a dysfunction of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Terry S Hyman, ‘Voluntary Handicaps – Should Drug Abuse, Alcoholism and 
Obesity be Protected by Pennsylvania’s Anti-discrimination Laws?’ (1980-1981) 85 
Dickinson Law Review 475 and n 115. 
121 Opinion of AG Jääskinen (n 3) para 60.  
122 ibid, para 59. 
123 See for the evolution of US federal law, Judith J Johnson, ‘Rescue the Americans 
with Disabilities Act from Restrictive Interpretations: Alcoholism as an Illustration’ 
(2007) 27 North Illinois University Law Review 169. 
124  For a discussion and references of cases where the concept of reasonable 
accommodation was addressed with respect to alcoholism and drug abuse see ibid, 
235-237. 
125 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a) (1994). See for a concrete case, where the court endorses the 
exclusion, Shafer v Preston Mem’l Hosp. Corp., 107 F.3d 274 (4th Cir 1997).  
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both the metabolic system and the neurological appetite-suppressing signal 
system, capable of causing adverse effects within the musculoskeletal, 
respiratory, and cardiovascular systems.’126 This reasoning was based on an 
expert’s testimony. In subsequent cases, however, the ‘physiological 
requirement’ turned to be a deadlock. Indeed, in several landmark rulings 
(Andrews, Watkins and Francis), 127  courts dismissed obesity-as-disability 
claims where the physiological disorder was not proved, relying on Cook 
and EEOC regulations. According to the reasoning thereunder, the 
alternative solution would make of ‘disability’ a ‘catch-all clause’.128 In 
addition, the court found in Andrews that the physiological requirement 
applied to all stages of obesity, including morbid one.  
 
This jurisprudence resulted in several drawbacks. First, by requiring 
obesity to be physiologically-based, the courts indirectly reintroduced the 
‘voluntariness argument’, as the individuals whose obesity was caused by 
non-medical factors (labelled as voluntary conduct or lack of action) were 
excluded. Second, the physiological requirement was applied not only 
when the claimant alleged to be ‘actually’ disabled, but also to be ‘regarded’ 
as such (see below Part IV, section 2). This gave rise to denying protection 
to obese individuals who, albeit able to perform required professional 
duties, had received unfair treatment on the basis of stereotypes (eg an 
obese individual not hired because presumed to be less motivated at work).  
 
Against this background, an alternative solution has been found in some 
instances, thereby relaxing scrutiny on ‘impairment’.  
 
2. Obesity as a per se ‘Impairment’? 
In contrast to its peers from the 2nd and 6th circuits, a court seated in 
Louisiana (5th circuit) established in EEOC v Resources for Human 
Development129 (quoted by the applicant in Kaltoft)130 that there was no need 
for a ‘physiological disorder’ in case of morbid obesity. Interestingly, the 
court came to this conclusion, even though the EEOC provided an expert 
testimony showing that the claimant’s obesity resulted from a 
physiological disorder. In subsequent cases, courts of some circuits 
followed the same solution, equally confined to morbid obesity.131  
 
One of the justifications given under this alternative line of cases was built 
on Congress’ general message when adopting the ADAAA in 2008 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Cook v Rhode Island (n 116).. 
127 Respectively Andrews v State of Ohio, 104 F.3d 803; EEOC v Watkins Motor Lines, 
Inc, 463 F.3d 436; Francis v City of Meriden, 129 F. 3d 281. 
128 Andrews v State of Ohio (n 127).  
129 EEOC v Resources for Human Dev., Inc, 827 F. Supp. 2d 688, 693-94 (E.D. La. 2011): 
‘[I]f the charging party is severely obese- there is no explicit requirement that obesity 
be based on physiological impairment’.   
130 See Opinion of AG Jääskinen (n 1) para 53 and fn 48. 
131 See eg Lowe v American Eurocopter, LLC, 1:10CV24-A-D, WL 5232523 (N.D. Miss. 
Dec. 16, 2010). 
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(amendment of the ADA). Therein, Congress urged the courts to construe 
disability ‘in favor of a broad coverage to the maximum extent 
permitted.’132 By the same token, it rejected cases where federal courts had 
‘narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the 
ADA, thus eliminating protection for many individuals whom [it] intended 
to protect.’133 Although targeted cases did not concern obesity,134 some 
courts found in this message a justification for departing from the case law 
requiring a physiological cause.135 The EEOC followed these dynamics by 
removing from its regulations that obesity is rarely an impairment136 and 
inserting in its Compliance Manual that morbid obesity is clearly one.137 
 
Duntworth’s observation in 1999 that ‘(…) obesity discrimination remains a 
fluctuating and non-cohesive area of law’138 still holds true today. Indeed, 
there is a significant split among federal circuit courts on whether a 
physiological disorder is necessary to meet the impairment condition. 
Under the initial line of cases, all stages of obesity must be physiologically-
based to be qualified as an ‘impairment’. Under the alternative line, stages 
of obesity are treated differently (no need to show a physiological cause for 
morbid obesity).  
 
In the EU context, the fact that Mr Kaltoft was morbidly obese has 
seemingly not played any role when interpreting ‘disability’. Further, 
neither the judges, nor the AG, have questioned whether obesity qualifies 
as an ‘impairment’. There may be two reasons for this. The first one is that 
the defendant in Kaltoft has not asserted before the CJEU that obesity 
does not qualify as an ‘impairment’ for the purposes of the EED. Indeed, 
he only refuted that obesity was a disability from a general standpoint. 
This significantly distinguishes Kaltoft from the US cases we addressed. 
Additionally, one must recall that Kaltoft was delivered in the framework 
of a preliminary ruling. Accordingly, the CJEU held that it is incumbent on 
the national court to determine whether the different conditions arising 
when interpreting ‘disability’ are met in the present case.139 It would be 
interesting to see whether this issue will be discussed or not by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A). 
133 ibid.  
134 Sutton v United Air lines, Inc, 527 US 471 (1999); Toyota Motor Manufacturing, 
Kentucky, Inc v Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002); Murphy v United Parcel Service, Inc, 527 
US 516; Albertson's, Inc v Kirkingburg, 527 US 555 (1999) were mentioned by the 
Congress as illustrations of narrow understanding of ‘disability’. See note to 42 U.S. 
Code § 12101 http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ325/html/PLAW-
110publ325.htm (accessed 6 June 2015). 
135 Lowe v. American Eurocopter (n 131). 
136 29 C.F.R. pt 1630 app § 1630.2(j) (2008). 
137 EEOC Compliance Manual § 902.2(c)(5)(ii), 2011.   
138 Kimberley B. Duntworth, ‘Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc.: Drawing the Line 
at Obesity?’ (1994) 24 Golden Gate University Law Review 523, 537.  
139 Case C-354/13 (n 1) para 64. 
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referring court’s in its final judgment.140 The second reason for the court 
not to examine ‘impairment’ with respect to obesity is that it considered 
that obesity met the impairment (medical element of ‘disability’) 
requirement.141 This would follow an ‘equation’ approach, whereby obesity 
equates to an ‘impairment’ in the sense of a medical disorder. This could 
be inferred from both the AG’s opinion142 and the judgment.143 The CJEU 
may also want to focus less on the medical element of disability, although 
recognising that obesity generally raises medical issues. This would indeed 
be a manifestation of the shift from the so-called ‘medical’ model of 
disability to the ‘social’ one that it recently realised. Indeed, after having 
stated in Chacón Navas 144  that disability is a limitation caused by an 
‘impairment’ (exclusively by the ‘medical element’) it changed its approach 
in HK Danmark (Ring and Skouboe Werge),145 holding that disability results 
from the interaction between the impairment and ‘various barriers’ (‘social 
element’).146 As observed by AG Wahl in Z., commenting on this shift, 
disability ‘arises from a failure of the social environment to adapt to and 
accommodate the needs of people with impairments.’147 By endorsing the 
social model, less scrutiny may therefore be put on the medical element of 
‘disability’, which would be arguably less difficult to prove (a deadlock less 
difficult to open) than under the medical model. Under US law, the 
lowering of focus, when observed, is limited to morbid obesity, where it is 
a per se impairment.  
 
To conclude this section, we note that under US law, the scrutiny of 
‘impairment’ (part of the causation element of disability) has decreased 
with respect to obesity. Kaltoft goes in line with the evolution of US law 
and may go even further by presumably equating obesity to impairment.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 On 27 March 2015, this judgement had not yet been delivered. We draw on a 
phone call to the clerk authorities to the referring Court on that date.   
141 Alternatively Lisa Waddington remarks that the CJEU has simply not explored 
the meaning of impairment with respect to obesity and that obesity may be caused 
by an impairment. This reasoning differs from qualifying obesity as a per se 
impairment. See Lisa Waddington (n 17), 23.  
142 In the opinion, obesity is presented as ‘growing problem in modern society’ with 
reference to the already mentioned Commission’s White Paper (n 4), see Opinion of 
AG Jääskinen (n 3) para 1 and fn 2. 
143 Where it is mentioned that obesity is registered in the ‘International Statistical 
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems’ of the WHO (ICD-10), see 
Case C-354/13 (n 1) para 18. 
144 Case C-13/05 (n 19), see for a criticism for embracing the medical model of 
‘disability’ in this case, Lisa Waddington, ‘Case C-13/05, Chacón Navas v Eurest 
Colectividades SA’ (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 487. 
145 See Joined Cases C-337/11 and C-335/11 (n 20). 
146 This shift of approach was justified by the ratification of the UNCRPD by the EU 
to which the CJEU makes explicit reference, ibid, para 37.  
147 Opinion of AG Wahl in Case C-363/12 (n 19)  para 88, quoting Lisa Waddington, 
‘The European Union and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities: A Story of Exclusive and Shared Competences’ (2011) 18 Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law 431, 436.  
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It is difficult to predict whether this evolution would be applied to 
conditions such as alcoholism or drug abuse. This may give rise to tensions 
between EU and some national laws on a very delicate issue. Indeed,  at 
least in the UK, alcoholism and drug abuse have been expressly excluded 
from the scope of ‘impairment’ (and consequently disability) by the 
legislator.148 Contrastingly, alcoholism has been qualified as a disability 
under Irish non-discrimination law by the Irish Equality Body, albeit not 
in the employment context. 149  Consequently, there are discrepancies 
between at least two Member States on this question and there may be 
more in the future now that the concept of disability is expanding. One 
could argue that the CJEU should leave a certain margin of appreciation to 
EU Member States in this regard. This would, however, run counter to the 
CJEU’s statement 150  that ‘disability’ under the EED must be given a 
‘uniform’ interpretation throughout the Union.  
 
IV.  SHIFTING THE FOCUS ON DISABILITY’S EFFECTS IN OBESITY 
CASES 
 
1. Obesity’s Limiting effects on the Employee (Actual Disability) 
The interpretation of ‘disability’ will be still disputed before the US and 
EU courts, despite less scrutiny on the causation element. Indeed, it seems 
that the courts’ focus of attention is shifting from the causation element 
(what originates in disability) to the consequence one (how disability 
manifests itself).  
 
Recall that the basic idea of disability is that it involves a limitation and, 
for our purpose, an individual’s limitation in relation to his/her 
professional activity. This is the ‘consequence element’. We see two 
approaches to the assessment of the limitation: a general and a contextual 
one. Under the general approach, the limitation is assessed with respect to 
various activities. By contrast, under the concrete one, a certain condition 
may be limiting in some contexts and not in others. Illustratively, colour 
blindness is not limiting (at least in principle) for an array of jobs (eg 
lawyer, writer, computer programmer…), but may be for others (eg 
painter). Thus, in employment cases, the concrete perspective would lead 
to determining whether obesity has limiting effects in consideration of a 
specific job’s functions. On the basis of judicial interpretations, it seems 
that the US and the EU have followed divergent paths. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 See Equality Act 2006. Note, however, that the effects of alcoholism (eg liver 
diseases) are not precluded from qualifying as an ‘impairment’ (therefore potentially 
as a ‘disability’), see ‘Guidance on matters to be taken into account in determining 
questions relating to the definition of disability’, A7,  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/85010/
disability-definition.pdf (accessed 6 June 2015).  
149 Irish Equality Officer has found it to be included within ‘disability’ under the 
Equal Status Act 2000 (A Complainant v Cafe Kylemore, DEC-S2002-024 of 2 May 
2003) (alcoholic customer refused access to a restaurant).  
150 Case C-13/05 (n 19) para 42. 
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A. The General Approach to the Worker’s Limitation (US) 
To recall, the ‘actual’ prong of disability in the ADA (the ‘regarded as’ 
prong is addressed below in  section 2) requires an ‘impairment’, ‘(…) that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual.’151 
The expression ‘major life activities’ was clarified in the EEOC 
implementing regulations by means of a non-exhaustive152 list of ‘activities’. 
Several of those are relevant to obesity such as ‘walking’, ‘standing’, 
‘sitting’, ‘lifting’, ‘bending’ and ‘breathing’,153 as they may be affected by it. 
When interpreting the expression, courts endorsed in several cases a 
general perspective.  
 
Swam v Commonwealth of Virginia Department of State police154 typified this 
approach. In this case, an obese woman was hired as a State trooper. She 
exceeded maximum weight allowable under the personnel guidelines of the 
Virginia Department of State Police and was hired with the understanding 
that she would reach the appropriate weight during the course of her 
employment. After having received numerous warnings because of not 
reaching the prescribed weight, she was terminated from her employment 
as a trooper. Basing its reasoning on EEOC regulations and case law, the 
court found that ‘working’ could be an ‘activity’ within the meaning of 
‘major life activities’. However, it stressed that this expression could not be 
interpreted with respect to one particular job.155 Thus, the court found that 
the skills required for a trooper (eg protecting oneself from assault, pursue, 
confront or capture offenders) were ‘job-specific’, and therefore, could not 
qualify as ‘major life activities’.  
 
This general approach has at times been applied with reference to an 
abstract standard when interpreting ‘substantially’ (the impairment must 
be substantially limiting). Illustratively, in Hill v Verizon Maryland156 the 
claimant was originally employed for installing and repairing customers’ 
telephone service and making cross connects. Because of his weight, he 
was unable to work aloft and was reallocated because he exceeded the 
company’s weight standards. Ultimately, his salary was reduced, a 
development that Mr Hill claimed to be discriminating. The court found 
he was not ‘substantially’ disabled because he could still do a handful of 
activities despite his obesity (eg ‘walking’, ‘cooking’, ‘doing laundry’, ‘caring 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). 
152 Recognised by the Supreme Court in Bragdon v Abbott, 524 US 624 (1998).  
153 See for the full list, 42 U.S.C § 12102(2)(A). 
154 Smaw v Commonwealth of Virginia Department of State Police, 862 F.Supp. 1469 
(E.D.Va.1994). 
155 This approach was also subsequently followed by the US Supreme Court, see 
Toyota Motor Manufacturing v Williams (n 134) where it held that the worker’s ability 
to do the required manual work (having to use hands and arms extended at and above 
shoulder for extended periods of time) were not central ‘in most people’s daily life’ 
and therefore she was not substantially limited in performing tasks’.  
156 Hill v Verizon Maryland, Inc, WL 2060088 (D. Md. July 13, 2009).  
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for himself’…). The Court came to this conclusion by using an abstract 
standard of reference as it noted that the worker was ‘able to perform all of 
the normal activities that the average person performs, even if a bit slower, 
or to a lesser degree.’157 This contrasts with the contextual approach.   
 
B. The Contextual Approach to the Worker’s Limitation (EU) 
On the basis of its jurisprudence and of several AG’s opinions thereunder, 
we can assert that the CJEU has endorsed the contextual approach, at least 
at first glance. To recall, under the HK Danmark (Ring and Skouboe Werge) 
definition, disability refers to a ‘limitation’ that ‘may hinder the full and 
effective participation of the person concerned in professional life on an 
equal basis with other workers’ (‘the consequence element’).158 Importantly, 
the CJEU has not taken verbatim the consequence element as in the 
UNCRPD, which refers to participation ‘in society’ (article 1). This has 
had an impact in the case of Z.159 
 
Notwithstanding this consideration and as stressed by AG Wahl, 160 
‘disability is context-dependent and situational: for instance, a long-term 
illness such as diabetes or indeed an allergy may, depending on the 
surrounding environment, constitute a disability.’ This has also been 
illustrated by AG Bot in Glatzel161 (dealing with visual impairment for truck 
drivers) with the historical example of Admiral Nelson, who led his men 
and won the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, whilst he had lost one eye at the 
siege of Calvi in 1794. In the AG’s words: ‘although objectively suffering 
from a visual deficiency, that deficiency did not constitute a disability in 
those circumstances.’162 Therefore, the limitation is assessed with respect 
to participation in professional life in a given context. In Kaltoft, AG 
Jääskinen endorses the same approach at first glance, stressing that ‘the 
applicability of the concept of disability depends on the concrete 
circumstances of the work’.163 However, two elements suggest that his 
reasoning is characterised by the general approach. First,164 he opined that 
the consequence element can be met if the impairment ‘causes limitations 
in full and effective participation in professional life in general on equal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 ibid. 
158 Case C-354/13 (n 1) para 38.  
159 As illustrated by case C-363/12 (n 19). In this case a disabled mother, having had 
recourse to a surrogacy arrangement, was refused a maternity leave, what she alleged 
to be discrimination based on disability. The CJEU refuted that the mother had a 
‘disability’ for the purposes of the EED as ‘the inability to have a child by 
conventional means does not in itself, in principle, prevent the commissioning 
mother from having access to, participating in or advancing in employment’, para 81. 
As remarked by Lisa Waddington, this amounted to denying the mother access to an 
‘employment-related benefit’. See Lisa Waddington (n 17) 21. 
160 Opinion of AG Wahl (n 147) para 84.   
161 Case C-356/12 (n 20), Opinion of AG Bot, ECLI:EU:C:2013:505. 
162 ibid, fn 19. 
163 Opinion of AG Jääskinen (n 3) paras 42-43.   
164 I thank Prof Lisa Waddington for making this point.  
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terms with persons not having that condition.’165 He illustrates the idea 
with a wheelchair worker (travel bound agent) whose participation in 
professional life is not affected by his condition.166 Even if in this concrete 
case, this participation is not limited, the worker could be qualified as 
having a ‘disability’ ‘because of the physical difficulties that inevitably arise 
in performing tasks, even if it does not affect the capacity of the person 
concerned to carry out the specific work in question.’167 In other words, 
some individuals, like those in a wheel chair would always be ‘disabled’ 
within the meaning of EU law. The approach runs counter to the 
contextual one enhanced by the social model of disability. Indeed, if, 
according to the social model, disability arises because of the interaction 
between the impairment and the environmental barriers (eg inaccessible 
buildings) it would disappear (or at least be reduced) thanks to the removal 
of these barriers. One hint suggests that the AG wanted to include both 
situations, contextual and general, when he says that the general limitation 
is ‘sufficient’, meaning it could also include a contextual one. Another 
element characterising a general approach lies in the reasoning’s 
application to obesity. Indeed, the AG tackled the consequence element 
with a strong emphasis on morbid obesity, stating that ‘most probably only 
(…) morbid obesity will create limitations, such as problems in mobility, 
endurance and mood, that amount to a ‘disability’ under the EED.168 As for 
individuals in a wheel chair, this suggests that some medical conditions are 
more likely than others to endorse functional limitations. Possibly true 
from a statistical and medical point of view, the approach runs afoul of the 
social-based approach in our view. Indeed, he addressed this condition 
with respect to the consequences that morbid obesity generally has, rather 
than on focusing on Mr Kaltoft’s case. In addition, his statement suggests 
that ‘moderate’ obesity is less likely to be a disability than ‘morbid’ obesity.  
 
In contrast, CJEU’s judges have not drawn a distinction between morbid 
and other stages of obesity. Indeed, they emphasised that obesity can be a 
disability ‘under given circumstances’ for the concerned worker, stressing 
that it can limit his participation in professional life ‘on account of reduced 
mobility or the onset in that person, of medical conditions preventing him 
from carrying out his work or causing discomfort when carrying out his 
professional activity.’ 169  This examination is left to the concrete 
examination of the referring court.  
 
Therefore, limiting effects of obesity on the individual participation in 
professional life are taken into account by both the US courts and the 
CJEU to determine whether obesity amounts to a disability or not in a 
different manner. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Opinion of AG Jääskinen (n 3) para 47.   
166 ibid, para 39.   
167 ibid, para 45. 
168 ibid, para 56.  
169 Case C-354/13 (n 1) para 58-59.  
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What was not addressed in Kaltoft by the CJEU is whether ‘disability’ 
covers the case of obese individuals who are perceived as not able to 
perform professional duties, whilst they are (or may be able to, but have 
not been given the opportunity to show it). This is especially relevant for 
obesity cases, as obesity may endorse limiting effects, not in reality, but in 
minds. 
 
2.Obesity’s Effect on Minds (Perceived Disability) 
A. Coverage of Obese Individuals ‘Regarded as’ Disabled   
Under US law, individuals who are perceived as disabled, albeit they are 
not, are included in the definition of ‘disability’ (under the ‘regarded as’ 
prong) and may therefore be entitled to protection under US law. As 
Justice William J Brennan stated ‘Congress acknowledged that society’s 
accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as 
handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual 
impairment.’170 Under EU law, it is still unsure whether these individuals 
fall under ‘disability’.171 Kaltoft represents a missed opportunity in this 
respect, whilst obesity raises this question as a matter of fact.  
 
Indeed, it has been noticed in the US 172  and beyond 173  that obese 
individuals are subject to a handful of stereotypes. To give some examples, 
they are often perceived as ‘less motivated’ or ‘lazy’174 and ‘having health 
problems’. Illustratively, in Cook,175 the employer refused to hire an obese 
candidate believing obesity heightened the risk of a heart disease. As 
already discussed, obese individuals are indeed likely to have medical 
problems (see above Part II, section 2). However, and as found by the 
court in Cook, applying this general statement to a concrete case, without 
further examination, is discriminatory.176 
 
Another ‘regarded as’ case is worth mentioning. Texas Bus Lines 177 
concerned an obese woman who was denied a bus driver job, although she 
had good references and successfully passed a road test. The bus company 
based its refusal on a doctor’s opinion who concluded after an examination 
lasting five to six minutes that the job applicant ‘can’t move swiftly in case 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 School Bd. of Nassau County v Arline, 480 US 273 (1987). 
171 See eg Lisa Waddington (n 17) 24 and (n 144) 497. 
172 See eg Jane B Korn (n 91) and (n 108).  
173  Tamar Kricheli-Katz, ‘Choice-Based Discrimination: Labor-Force-Type 
Discrimination Against Gay Men, the Obese, and Mothers’ (2013) 10 Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies 670, 677. 
174 See eg Stuart W Flint and Jeremé Snook (n 10) 189: ‘Obesity may lead to the 
stigmatizing of obese persons as less productive, lazy and feckless’ and Jane B Korn 
(n 91) 14.  
175 See eg Cook, (n 126). 
176 ibid, para 27. 
177 EEOC v Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965 (S.D. Tex. 1996). 
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of an accident.’178 The court concluded that the blind reliance on a limited 
doctor’s examination led to the perception of disability. 
  
Under EU law, the discussion is only beginning to take shape. Among all 
disability cases before the CJEU, none concerned a ‘regarded as’ 
situation,179 whilst the EED is silent on this point. In Kaltoft, the AG did 
refer to it unlike CJEU’s judges (calling it ‘falsely presumed’ disability),180 
but opined that it was not necessary for the case at hand.181 However, he 
referred to a report of the Commission,182 where the institution stated that 
EU directives (including the EED) cover direct discrimination ‘on the basis 
of a wrong perception or assumption of protected characteristics.’183 In the 
report, the institution illustrates the idea only with ‘ethnic origin’ and 
‘homosexuality’.184 With respect to disability, it addresses the question in 
the annexes of this report in a rather cautious manner stating that ‘[t]he 
same reasoning would appear to apply, mutatis mutandis, to all other 
grounds of discrimination protected under the two Directives.’185 
 
Considering that the CJEU may recognise ‘disability’ to cover individuals 
‘regarded as’ disabled, it is worth examining what kind of situations could 
be captured under this expression. The US experience is again relevant. 
Three situations have been identified by the EEOC in this regard.186 Each 
of them is illustrated with a general example (from S Parott)187 that we then 
transpose to obesity.  
 
First, it covers those who have an impairment that does not substantially 
limit ‘major life activities’ but is treated as constituting such limitation 
such as an employee with controlled high blood pressure. Such a situation 
was met in aforementioned Dutch case on mail delivery by bicycle.188 
Herein, the Equality Body noted that the post company refused to hire the 
obese candidate, on the basis of general assumptions, instead of actual 
facts, to conclude that this candidate was not suitable for the concerned 
job. Importantly, it stressed that the Dutch equality legislation aims at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 ibid. 
179 There is only one case where a claimant was protected under the EED against 
discrimination without having the protected characteristic (discrimination by 
association of mother discriminated against because of her having a disabled child), 
see Case C-303/06 S. Coleman v Attridge Law and Steve Law [2008] ECR I-5603. 
180 Opinion of AG Jääskinen (n 3) para 48. 
181 ibid, para 49.  
182 European Commission (n 99).  
183 ibid, point 4.5. 
184 ibid. 
185 Annexes to the Joint Report (n 99) Annex II-2-c. 
186 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1)–(3) (2005). 
187  Sarah J Parrot, ‘The ADA and Reasonable Accommodation of Employees 
Regarded as Disabled: Statutory Fact or Bizarre Fiction?’ (2006) 67 Ohio State Law 
Journal 1509, 1512, fn 59. 
188 Commissie Gelijke Behandeling (n 82). See for the company’s full reasoning, point 
3.14.  
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preventing employers from basing their recruitment practices on 
‘stereotypical expectations and assumptions’ 189  and concluded that the 
candidate was directly discriminated against on the grounds of ‘disability’ 
or ‘chronic illness’.  
 
The second situation is when an individual has an impairment that 
substantially limits major life activities only as a result of others’ attitudes 
towards such impairment. It can happen when a worker’s prominent facial 
scaring or obesity (provided that it is qualified as an impairment) prompts 
clients’ or colleagues negative reactions and that consequently, the 
worker’s employer decides to dismiss him/her. Such a case was handled by 
the ECtHR, even if it did not mention ‘disability’. I.B v Greece 190 
concerned an employee whose contract was terminated following exerted 
pressure by his colleagues on their employer to do so after they found out 
that he was HIV-positive. The Court noted that HIV-status was the basis 
of the dismissal and concluded that the employee had been directly 
discriminated on the grounds of his health. 191  We think it would be 
covered under the ‘regarded as’ prong of disability as the stigmatised 
worker was perfectly able to do his job, but was limited in his participation 
in professional life because of his colleagues’ reactions to his impairment. 
 
In the third situation, an individual is treated as having a substantially 
limiting impairment: an employee rumoured to have AIDS although it was 
not true for instance. This appears to be a less useful situation for ‘obesity’ 
as it seems unlikely that an individual is rumoured to be obese, while 
he/she is not.192    
 
B. Capturing Appearance Discrimination through Disability? 
At least one other deadlock could, however, be put on the way to the 
finding of ‘disability’ when addressing the ‘regarded as’ avenue. We will 
address it with respect to different treatment based on appearance. Recall 
that appearance discrimination is not prohibited under EU and US federal 
law. Direct discrimination (‘adverse treatment’ under US law) based on 
appearance would arise if a company refuses to hire an obese (or 
overweight) candidate (or to systematically hire slim individuals), unless 
this different treatment is justified by the fact that a certain appearance 
(such as slimness, which would exclude obesity) is under EED’s language a 
‘genuine and determining occupational requirement’ (EU law)193 or, under 
US law, a ‘bona fide qualification’.194 Indeed, this argument is at times 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 ibid; ‘De Commissie wijst erop dat één van de doelstellingen van de WGBH/CZ 
nu juist is om te voorkomen dat werkgevers zich bij hun aannamebeleid laten leiden 
door stereotype verwachtingen en vooronderstellingen’ (point 3.18).  
190 I.B. v Greece (n 48). 
191 ibid, para 91.  
192 As remarked by Jane B Korn, ‘(obesity) is apparent to all and impossible to hide’ (n 
91) 14. 
193 Article 4 (1), EED (n 2). 
194 See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(A). 
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brought to justify that bearing certain physical characteristics is essential 
for the company’s image. We could also imagine that a company asserts 
that fitting with its image is a competence or an essential function. This 
would justify a refusal to hire.195  
 
Against this background, we will address two questions. To which extent 
can a different treatment based on appearance be justified under the guise 
of image? Can a worker considered by an employer as not fitting with this 
image be ‘regarded as’ disabled?  
 
In our view, the appearance requirement is not justified for jobs such as 
restaurants’ or cafés’ waiters as the essential function of such jobs is rather 
taking customers’ orders and serving them accordingly in a courteous and 
efficient manner. This issue is even more difficult in sectors where obesity 
may contradict a company’s image based on the opposite profile of the 
obese individual. Two French cases can be mentioned in that respect. The 
first one involved the famous company Weight Watchers. On its website, 
the company presents itself as dedicated ‘to helping (customers) lose 
weight’.196 In a case brought before a civil court (ruling is dated 2007),197 
one of the company’s animators was dismissed because she exceeded the 
weight prescribed by the maximum weight clause contained in her 
employment contract. The court found the dismissal not to be 
discriminatory relying on the company’s image. We personally opine that 
too much reliance on a company’s image leads to unfair differential 
treatment, whilst a worker may be perfectly capable of performing the 
required duties. Indeed, the employee was in charge of helping customers 
to lose weight by providing advice. Why would a Weight Watcher coach not 
be able to give valuable advice for losing weight only because he/she is 
obese? Interestingly, and this comes back to our discussion on the 
relevance of obesity’s causes (Part III, section 1), the court held that it 
would have found the dismissal discriminatory (on the basis of 
appearance), if overweightness of the person concerned would have been  
immutable because in that case it would be a ‘disability’.  
 
The second case, already mentioned, was recently handled (2014) by the 
French Equality Body in an anonymous decision and concerned a clothing 
retailer (probably Abercrombie and Fitch),198 which clearly argued that 
appearance is an ‘essential genuine and determining occupational 
requirement’, on the basis of the French domestic legal Act 199  that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 Neither EU nor US law requires recruiting or prohibits dismissing an individual 
who is not competent or capable. See, respectively, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 and EED (n 2) 
Recital 17. 
196  For more information on this company, see its website ‘who we are’: 
https://welcome.weightwatchers.com/who-we-are/ (accessed 6 June 2015). 
197 CA de Douai 29 September 2004 n° 00-523, ch.soc., Dalle-Lepers c. Sarl Weight 
Watchers Operations France. 
198 See n 63. 
199 See Article L.1133-1 of the French Labour Code (Code du travail). 
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transposed the EED.200 Indeed, the company argued that the physical 
representation of the clothing brand thanks to one’s ‘body, charm, 
attractiveness and youth’ is essential and determining.201 In this respect, 
prioritising recruitment of managers with an ‘exceptional outward appeal’ 
(‘un attrait personnel exceptionnel’) was deemed disproportionate to the 
objective of promoting the brand’s image.202Addressing the recruitment of 
managers, the institution put the focus on the concerned job’s functions 
highlighting that it consists, for managers, in leading a team. 203 
Interestingly, the French institution stressed in its reasoning the 
importance that appearance is not a changeable characteristic (‘une 
caractéristique manipulable’). 204  This would imply a distinction between 
medically-caused obesity (and being overweight) and other types and it 
takes us back again on obesity’s causation (Part III, section 1). 
 
Could these cases be tackled through the ‘regarded as’ avenue? We can see 
two directions. The first consists in putting focus on other questions than 
‘disability’ (eg if being slim, or not obese, is a ‘genuine and determining 
occupational requirement’ or a ‘bona fide qualification’), leaving aside the 
question whether there is a ‘disability’ or not. The second direction is to 
integrate the ‘regarded as’ avenue, as existing in the US, into the EU 
concept of ‘disability’. An argument supporting such step would be the 
shift from a medical to a social model of disability, seemingly realised in 
HK Danmark (Ring and Skouboe Werge), as well as the fact that the EU is a 
party to the UNCRPD. Indeed, as recognised by the CJEU in that case, 
which made a reference to the UNCRPD, the social model argues that 
‘various barriers’ play a role in causing disability. Quoting the UNCRPD, 
AG Wahl specifies that ‘barriers’ can be of attitudinal nature,205 suggesting 
others’ reaction (including stereotypes) towards one’s characteristic. In our 
view and as we draw from the US experience, these barriers would cover 
the situation of a worker deemed not to be able to work for a company 
because his/her obesity does not fit with its image. In turn, this would 
open the ‘disability’ door, leading to other ones such as whether there has 
been a direct or indirect discrimination or whether a reasonable 
accommodation has not been provided (unless appearance is considered in 
this case as a ‘genuine and determining occupational requirement’ or a 
‘bona fide qualification’). Therefore, under this framework, and through 
the ‘regarded as’ avenue, disability could cover appearance cases.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 Loi n°2008-496, 27 May 2008, portant diverses dispositions d’adaptation au droit 
communautaire dans le domaine de la lutte contre les discriminations. 
201 See Défenseur des Droits, MLD n° 2014-147 (n 62) point 83. 
202 ibid, point 95.  
203 ibid, point 89.  
204 ibid, point 64. 
205 Opinion of AG Wahl (n 147) para 96. 
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On both sides of the Atlantic, litigation practice shows that the 
interpretation of ‘disability’ within the contemplation of non-
discrimination law is not only a question of semantics. It has also legal 
repercussions as the interpretation can either include or exclude an 
individual from the scope of disability discrimination. The different sub-
concepts (eg impairment) or elements (causation and consequence) 
mobilised to construe ‘disability’ can be subject of more or less strict 
judicial scrutiny. In the US, we have seen that courts, at least in some 
circuits, tend to interpret ‘impairment’ less strictly than before. If our 
assumption that the CJEU equates obesity with ‘impairment’ proves true, 
its jurisprudence would be more inclusive than the US courts’ most lenient 
one that equates only morbid obesity to disability if obesity is not 
physiologically-based. The paper has shown that disability is a valuable 
discrimination ground with respect to obesity. The consequence element 
is still interpreted by the US courts from a general (and sometimes 
abstract) perspective. This has proved to exclude individuals who would 
have been included under a contextual understanding of ‘disability’ that 
the CJEU seems to have embraced.  
 
Kaltoft is an important step. However, as shown in the paper, the CJEU 
should have borrowed (and could in the future) the ‘regarded as’ prong of 
‘disability’ from US law. The AG and the Commission both touched upon 
this issue, but failed to clearly admit that ‘regarded as’ disabled could be 
covered under the EED. In this regard, we argued that appearance cases 
could be captured under the ‘regarded as’ avenue. Consequently, some 
companies would have to show that their recruitment policy based on 
appearance is not discriminatory.  
